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W

hen a neutral country such as the United States has a rather sizeable
naval force in a confined area for the protection of vessels flying its
flag, it is inevitable that components of that force will, at times, find themselves
in anned confrontation with ships and military aircraft of belligerents in that
area. In the Iran-Iraq war, ships and military aircraft frequendy attacked the
tankers that the U.S. Navy had been sent to the Persian Gulf to protect, or even
attacked components of the U.S. Navy itsel£ There are several discrete examples
ofjust such confrontations.
On August 10, 1987, a U.S. Navy fighter plane fired two missiles at an Iranian
plane which had violated the "bubble" announced by the Navy as a measure of
self-protection.! And on August 25, 1987, a U.S. destroyer fired across the bows
of two small unidentified vessels which were approaching the tankers that the
destroyer was escorting? On April, 18, 1988, in retaliation for the damaging of
an American warship, United States anned forces attacked and destroyed two
Iranian oil platfonns (which were also used as anti-aircraft platfonns) and U.S.
naval vessels engaged in a subsequent encounter with Iranian vessels, all ofwhich
resulted in heavy Iranian casualties. However, as the individuals on the platforms
were given warning of the attacks which were about to take place, and Iranian
tugboats were pennitted to engage in rescue work without impediment by the
3
U.S. forces, no Iranians were rescued from the sea by the latter.
The first two incidents tenninated with no damages, no casualties and no
individuals in custody. The third incident tenninated with both Iranian casualties
and "splashed" personnel, but again with no individuals in custody. The question
these examples pose concerns the status of the members of the crews of such
ships or aircraft when they are disabled, sunk or shot down by the U.S. forces
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while they are engaged in such attacks, or while they are committing other illegal
acts against U.S. flagged merchant shipping, or warships, or planes, and when
they are thereafter rescued from the sea by those forces. I refer to "ships" rather
than "warships" because there exists a considerable question regarding the status
of some of the Iranian warships involved.
Article 14 of the 1910 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules with
Respect to Assistance and Salvage at Sea states that it does not apply to "ships
at war." However, article 11 (1) of the same Convention provides that:
Every master is bound, so far as he can do so without serious danger to his
vessel, her crew and passengers, to render assistance to everybody, even though an
enemy, found at sea in danger of being lost. 4
This humanitarian rule should be and in fact was complied with by the U.S.
naval forces in the Persian Gul£ For example, an Iraqi pilot whose plane had
been shot down by the Iranians was rescued from the sea by a component of
the U.S. naval forces. Shortly thereafter he was turned over to the Iraqi
authorities. On the night of September 21-22, 1987, an Iranian vessel, later
identified as the Iran Ajr, was observed by a U.S. Army helicopter equipped with
night-vision sensors to be laying mines in the Gulf in the vicinity of U.S. naval
vessels and an anchorage used by them and the tankers they were there to protect.
When the minelayer disregarded the radio orders of the helicopter to discontinue
its minelaying activity, the helicopter opened fire on the Iranian vessel and
rendered it dead in the water. 5 Twenty-six Iranian seamen and three bodies
were subsequendy rescued from the sea by a component of the U.S. naval
6
forces. Similarly, on October 8, 1987, when a U.S. helicopter flying over the
waters of the Persian Gulf was fired upon by a gunboat, it returned the fire. Four
wounded Iranians and the bodies of two others were recovered from the sea by
a component of the U.S. naval forces? Were the individuals who were rescued
after these incidents prisoners of war? While the question is moot at the moment
as all of the individuals were quickly repatriated through the agency of the
government of Oman, it is one which may require a hard decision at some time
8
in the future.
Common article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions Relative to the
Treatment of War Victims is the article concerned with the circumstances under
9
which those Conventions are to be applied. It provides that:
[T]he present Convention shall apply in all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. 10
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A number ofyears ago the International Committee ofthe Red Cross (ICRC)
produced lengthy, and what have subsequendy become authoritative,
commentaries with respect to each of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. Each
of these commentaries contains a substantially identical statement with respect
to common article 2. The pertinent portions of the Commentary on the 1949
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War state that:
Any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of

members of the armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article
2, even if one of the Parties denies the existence of a state of war. It makes no
difference how long the conflict lasts, how much slaughter takes place, or how
numerous are the participating forces; it suffices for the armed forces of one Power
to have captured adversaries falling within the scope of Article 4. Even if there
has been no fighting, the fact that persons covered by the Convention are detained is
s'1fficient for its application. The number of persons captured in such circumstances
. 0 f course, Immaten
.
·al.11
IS,
This will be an acceptable interpretation of the provisions of common article
2 in the great majority of cases. However, in some respects, and under some
circumstances, it may be too all-encompassing. When Major Arthur D.
Nicholson of the United States Army was shot and killed by a Russian soldier
in the Potsdam area on March 25, 1985, and his sergeant-driver was held prisoner
at gunpoint for a number of hours, he certainly constituted a person "covered
by the Convention" who was "detained.,,12 But was there an "armed conflict"
between the Soviet Union and the United States? Were the provisions of the
Prisoner-of-War Convention applicable to the sergeant? When Lieutenant
Robert O. Goodman of the United States Navy was shot down by the Syrian
Army on December 4, 1983, and was taken into custody by the Syrians and held
for one month before being released, once again there was certainly a person
"covered by the Convention" who was "detained.,,13 But was there an "armed
conflict" between Syria and the United States? Were the provisions of the
Prisoner-of-War Convention applicable to the lieutenant? The original
announcements made by both U.S. officials and the Syrians appeared to assume
14
that he was a prisoner-of-war. However, the United States appeared to have
changed its position. President Reagan later stated: "I don't know how you have
a prisoner of war when there is no declared war between nations. I don't think
that makes you eligible for the Geneva Accords.,,15
Although an isolated incident of the use of force between two nations may
be considered by one or both of them to be indicative of the existence of an
armed conflict between them, usually the nations involved will wish to keep
their options open and will not consider that such an incident has initiated an
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armed conflict-unless the very purpose of the incident was to serve as a basis
16
for such a claim.
The first question to be decided, then, is whether there is an armed conflict
between the parties. The ICRC takes the position that such incidents as those
which occurred in the Persian Gulf in September and October 1987 constitute
armed conflict and bring the Convention into play.17 I do not agree with that
conclusion. But even assuming arguendo that the ICRC position is correct, this
alone will not always solve the problem.
Article 4 of the 1949 Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention specifies the
categories of persons who are entided to the status of prisoners of war. First
among these categories are "[m]embers of the armed forces of a Party to the
conflict as well as militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed
forces.,,18 The Iranians who were recovered from the sea by the U.S. Navy on
September 22, 1987, were ~parendy members of the Iranian navy and the vessel
was an Iranian warship.
If there was an armed conflict and if the
Prisoner-o£..W ar Convention was applicable, they would unquestionably come
within the coverage of the quoted provision and would be entided to the
protection afforded by the Convention.
Suppose, however, tha~ they had been members of the "Revolutionary
Guards"-the individuals who appear to compose the crews of the so-called
"gunboats" which attack any and every ship found in the Persian Gulf, without
regard to the £lag that it flies or the cargo that it carries?O Do such individuals
fall within the category of persons entided to prisoner-of-war status when they
are rescued by U.S. naval forces from the waters of the Persian Gulfinto which
they have been precipitated by action of those same armed forces? Or are they
illegal combatants who are not entided to the benefits of that status? While we
really know very litde about the organization of the Revolutionary Guards, it
would appear that they are, at a minimum, members of a militia or volunteer
corps forming part of the Iranian armed forces. Under these circumstances, and
under the ICRC interpretation of the Convention provision, they, too, are
entided to the status of prisoners of war if they fall into the hands of another
power during a period of armed conflict. It is very possible that they have been
guilty ofviolations ofinternational law inasmuch as they have, without waming,
attacked unarmed, neutral vessels. But this does not affect their entidement to
prisoner-of-war status. It only means that they could be subjected to trial and
punishment for their illegal acts-an unlikely event.
My conclusion, then, is that occasional incidents do not constitute a state of
war, or even ofarmed conflict, if there is a difference, between the United States
and Iran or Iraq. Therefore, none of the Iranians who have been, or who are
likely to be, "splashed" and rescued by United States forces in the Persian Gulf
have been, or will be, entided to prisoner-of-war status. It must be borne in
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mind, however, that a decision that there is no anned conflict and that an
individual is, therefore, not entided to prisoner-of-war status only means that
he is not entided to the protection of all of the specific provisions of the 1949
Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention. It does not mean that he is unreservedly
at the mercy of the power in whose custody he finds himsel£ He is still entided
to all ofthe protection ofgeneral humanitarian law. For example, he must receive
any necessary medical care, he may not be denied adequate food and water, he
may not be tortured or otherwise maltreated, he may not be treated as a hostage,
etc.
One final aspect of the problem is worthy of mention. It is not beyond the
realm of possibility that some American military personnel serving in the Persian
Gulf will, in the future, fall into the power of the Iranian regime. It will
undoubtedly be recalled that the holding of hostages is not an unknown
phenomenon to that regime. It is devoudy to be hoped that the precedent that
the United States has established of immediate repatriation will contribute to
making it politically inexpedient for Iran to hold such American personnel as
hostages, as might otherwise have occurred.
Addendum

Even disregarding the perennial Arab-Israeli controversies, during the past
decade international crisis has followed international crisis in the Middle East in
general, and in the Persian Gulfin particular. Iran and Iraq fought a bloody war
from 1980 to 1988, a war which necessitated the establishment of a naval
presence in that area by half a dozen nations in order to protect neutral merchant
shipping. During 1984, the mystery of the mines in the Red Sea posed grave
difficulties for Egypt and its Suez Canal and necessitated a multilateral force to
clear the mines from the sea. During the 1980s there was rarely a moment when
the internecine conflict in Lebanon was not costing lives, with international
interventions on a number of occasions.21 Then, on 2 August 1990, less than
two years after the Iran-Iraq conflict had come to an inconclusive halt, Iraq,
under Saddam Hussein, invaded, occupied, and annexed its neighbor, Kuwait,
bringing down upon its head the wrath of the great majority of the members of
the international community, including most of the fifteen members of the
Security Council of the United Nations. Military forces from thirty nations
concentrated in Saudi Arabia and when non-military actions such as economic
blockades proved ineffective in inducing Saddam Hussein to recognize the error
of his actions, the Security Council authorized Kuwait and its cooperating
"coalition" states "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement
Resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions" if Iraq had not
22
complied with the mentioned resolutions by 15 January 1991. This was, of
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course, a euphemistic way of authorizing the use of armed force while avoiding
the need for any unpalatable words.
Aerial bombardment began shortly after the deadline. Inevitably, coalition
planes were shot down and crew members became prisoners ofwar of the Iraqis.
In this instance there was no question with respect to the applicability of the
23
1949 Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention. Although Iraq became a party to
this Convention in 1956, she paid as little attention to its provisions in this
24
conflict as she had during the Iran-Iraq War. In the other direction there was
a fairly substantial number of Iraqis who elected to become prisoners of war
rather than fight for Saddam Hussein. The ground war started late in February
and within a matter of days the number ofIraqi prisoners of war in the custody
25
of the members of the coalition reached the tens of thousands. Delegates of
the ICRC immediately began visiting these prisoners of war, a process which
thereafter continued without interruption.
When Iraq capitulated and agreed to comply with the provisions of the
previous Security Council resolutions, Security Council Resolution 686 (1991),
set forth the requirements to be imposed on Iraq in order to warrant a cease fire.
The resolution contained the following provision:
3. Further demand that Iraq:

(c) Arrange for immediate access to and release of all prisoners of war
under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross and return
the remains of any deceased personnel of the forces of Kuwait and the Member
States cooperating with Kuwait pursuant to resoiution 678 (1990) .... 26
On March 6, 1991, Iraq released thirty-five prisoners of war, asserting that
that was all she held?7 Shortly thereafter the coalition commenced the
incremental repatriation of the Iraqi prisoners of war who had expressed a desire
for repatriation?S That process was to continue until all Iraqi prisoners of war
who desired repatriation were back in Iraq.
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